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NOTES
FTC SUBSTANTIVE RULEMAKING AUTHORITY
Federal administrative agencies generally enforce statutqry man-
dates which are drawn in broad and ill-defined terms. Consequently,
one of the central tasks of such agencies is to formulate policies which
serve to elaborate and clarify the substantive law governing the con-
duct of regulated parties. Typically, such policies are developed
either pursuant to rulemaking proceedings or incident to agency adjudica-
tions.1
1. See NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 765-66, 770-71 (1969); SEC
v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202-03 (1947). Policy is made incident to adjudica-
tion to the extent that clear, but broad, doctrines are announced and the principle of
stare decisis is employed to create precedents. Legislative rulemaking produces a spe-
cific policy statement covering all cases within its scope arising in the future.
Of course, the extent of an agency's power to employ each of these procedures
is determined by the agency's enabling statute. See Fuchs, Agency Development of
Policy Through Rule-Making, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 781, 796-97 (1965); Shapiro, The
Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy,
78 HAnv. L. REv. 921, 960 (1965).
HEREAFTER THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS
NOTE:
Statement of Basis and Purpose of the Trade Regulation Rule for the Prevention
of Unfair or Deceptive Advertising of Cigarettes in Relation to the Health Hazards of
Smoking, 29 Fed. Reg. 8325 (1964) [hereinafter cited as 1964 Statement of Basis];
Burrus & Teter, Antitrust: Rulemaking v. Adjudication in the FTC, 54 GEo. L.J
1106 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Burrus & Teter];
Fuchs, Agency Development of Policy Through Rule-Making, 59 Nw. U.L REV.
781 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Fuchs];
Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look at Rulemaking and
Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. RV. 485 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Robinson];
Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Ad-
ministrative Policy, 78 HARv. L. Rav. 921 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Shapiro];
Wegman, Cigarettes and Health: A Legal Analysis, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 678 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Wegman];
Weston, Deceptive Advertising and the Federal Trade Commission: Decline of
Caveat Emptor, 24 FED. BJ. 548 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Weston];
Note, The Use of Rulemaking to Deny Adjudications Apparently Required by
Statute, 54 IowA L. REv. 1086 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Rulemaking to Deny Ad-
judications];
Note, FTC Substantive Rulemaking: An Evaluation of Past Practices and Proposed
Legislation, 48 N.Y.U.L. REV. 135 (1973) [hereinafter cited as FTC Substantive Rule-
making].
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For nearly fifty years after its creation in 1914, the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) relied exclusively upon agency adjudications as the
means of authoritatively defining and enforcing the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act's (FTCA) 2 broad prohibitions against "unfair methods of
competition" and "unfair or deceptive" -trade practices.3  As a result,
the scope of these standards of conduct remained uncertain, being sub-
ject to the necessity of evolution by case precedent, 4 and FTC enforce-
ment was hindered by the delays inherent in litigation, especially
where industry-wide violations required repeated hearings on the same,
or similar, issues.5 In 1962, in order to establish a more efficacious
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of Sept. 26, 1914, ch.
311, 38 Stat. 717).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1) (1970). The 1914 Act limited the prohibition to "un-
fair methods of competition." Act of Sept. 26, 1914, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 717. The
scope of the standard of illegality was expanded in 1938 by the Wheeler-Lea Amend-
ment to cover "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" as well. Act of March 21, 1938,
ch. 49, § 5, 52 Stat. 111.
4. In an FTC adjudication, see note 15 infra and accompanying text, the Commis-
sion must determine (1) whether the respondent is actually engaged in the conduct
cited in the FTC complaint and (2) whether such conduct constitutes unfair competi-
tion or a deceptive practice. It is the latter inquiry which results in the evolution of
agency policy.
Because of the unpredictable manner in which violations, and hence policy issues,
arise, the Commission has long found it necessary to employ several procedures aimed
at supplementing the adjudication process and more effectively providing regulated par-
ties with guidance as to Commission policy. Since 1919, the Commission has issued
Trade Practice Conference Rules, developed pursuant to the joint efforts of industry
and the Commission. (These rules as currently in force are reprinted at 4 CCH TRADE
REo. RP. 41,003-41,227.) The purpose of such rules is to obtain uniform volun-
tary compliance with the FTCA by making clear the Commission's policy concerning
certain trade practices. Note, Voluntary Compliance: An Adjunct to Mandatory Proc-
esses, 38 IND. L. Rv. 377, 385-88 (1963); Weston 566-67. But the rules are without
legal force. An industry member engaging in a trade practice contrary to a Trade
Practice Rule would not automatically be in violation of the FTCA; rather a complaint
alleging the trade practice to be in violation of the standard of illegality set forth in
the Act would be issued and a determination of the statutory validity of the challenged
conduct, apart from its conformity to any applicable Trade Practice Rule, would be-
come necessary in the subsequent adjudication. 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.5-.6, 17.1, 17.3-.4
(1973). See Auerbach, The Federal Trade Commission: Internal Organization and
Procedure, 48 MINN. L. REV. 383, 452 (1964); Shapiro 964; Weston 567; Note, supra
at 388. But cf. Prima Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 209 F.2d 405, 408 (2d Cir. 1954).
Likewise, the Commission has issued Guides, interpretations of the laws adminis-
tered by the Commission, since 1955, 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.5-.6, 17.1(a) (1973), and Ad-
visory Opinions, since 1962, id. §§ 1.1-.4. See Auerbach, supra, at 452-55; Wes-
ton 567; Note, supra at 394-95, 404. However, these supplemental procedures have not
served to eliminate uncertainty concerning agency policy and the probable legality of
certain trade practices. See REPORT OF ThE ABA COMMISSION TO STUDY THE FEDERAL
TRADE COMMNSSION 11 (1969); Shapiro 967.
5. See E. Cox, R. FELLMETH & J. ScnuLz, THE NADER REPORT ON THE FEERAL
TRADE CoMMIssioN 31, 71-87 (1969); Auerbach, supra note 4, at 449; Wegman 740;
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procedure for dealing with violations of the FTCA, the Commission
amended its procedures to provide for the promulgation of Trade Regula-
tion Rules which have the force of substantive law.6 Under this enforce-
ment procedure the scope of inquiry in FTC adjudications to which a
Trade Regulation Rule applies would be narrowed to the question of
whether ,a respondent's conduct violated the relevant rule, thus relieving
the Commission of the evidentiary burden of establishing, in each of a
number of cases, that a particular trade practice violates the broad
standards contained in the FTCA.7  Pursuant to this new procedure
Weston, 561; Note, The Federal Trade Commission and Reform of the Administrative
Process, 62 CoLuM. L. REv. 671, 697 (1962). Moreover, individual adjudications have
proven lengthy as well as repetitious. An FTC adjudication involving a single violator
may extend (from the issuance of a complaint to the issuance of a cease and desist order
to ultimate appellate court review) for a period from three to five years. See also
REPoRT oF Tm ABA COMmssiON, supra note 4, at 28-32; Simon, The Case Against
the Federal Trade Commission, 19 U. Cm. L. Rav. 297, 334 n.144 (1952); Weston
561; Note, supra, at 697 n.192. A glaring example of such delay is Carter Products,
Inc. v. FTC, 268 F.2d 461 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1959) (proceedings
extending over sixteen years).
6. 27 Fed. Reg. 4609 (1962); 16 C.F.R. § 1.11-.16 (1973).
Trade Regulation Rules specify certain trade practices as falling within the
FTCA's broad prohibitions against unfair trade practices. Under its procedures the
Commission may utilize a rule to resolve any issue in a cease and desist order adjudica-
tion to which it is relevant. 16 C.F.R. § 1.12(c) (1973); see 1964 Statement
of Basis 8371. The Commission has further indicated that in agency adjudications in
which a Trade Regulation Rule is applied, respondents would be precluded from intro-
ducing evidence for the purpose of rebutting either the propositions of law embodied
in the rule or the underlying factual determinations upon which the rule is based. Id.
at 8371-72. Initially, the FTC denied that Trade Regulation Rules had the force and
effect of governing law. Id. at 8369 n.143. However, the purpose of the rulemaking
program would be undermined if the rules were not consistently treated as being con-
trolling in subsequent adjudications and, thus, binding upon regulated parties. See Sha-
piro 966; Note, Federal Trade Commission-Lack of Authority to Promulgate Trade
Regulation Rules Having the Effect of Law, 14 B.C. INn. & COM. L. REv. 368, 377-
82 (1972).
7. The expectation of the Commission is that such use of rulemaking would tend
to encourage voluntary compliance by affected business entities. Moreover, where a
subsequent adjudication is required, the "streamlined" nature of the proceedings would
significantly reduce the burden of preventing industry-wide violations. 1964 Statement
of Basis 8371; see Note, supra note 6, at 378-80. See note 6 supra and accompanying
text.
Since 1962 the FTC has issued more than twenty Trade Regulation Rules. The
Commission's initial rulemaking efforts were of a modest nature dealing with relatively
simple problems which generated little or no controversy. See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 400.1
(1973) (deceptive labeling of sleeping bags); id. § 404.3 (deceptive labeling of table-
cloths). On three separate occasions more aggressive rulemaking by the Commission
was superseded by congressional action. Sections 132-34 of the Truth in Lending Act,
15 U.S.C. H9 1642-44 (1970), preempted a proposed rule aimed at regulating the un-
solicited mailing of credit cards, 35 Fed. Reg. 4614 (1970), rescinded, 36 Fed. Reg.
45 (1971). The Postal Reorganization Act, 39 U.S.C. § 3009 (1970), rendered unnec-
essary the proposed rule concerning the shipment of unordered merchandise, 35 Fed.
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the FTC, in 1971, issued a Trade Regulation Rule which specifies that
the failure of gasoline refiners or distributors to post the minimum
octane numbers of gasoline on dispensing pumps is an unfair or deceptive
trade practice.8  Two trade associations and thirty-four gasoline re-
fining companies brought suit for declaratory and injunctive relief, in
which they challenged, inter alia, .the Commission's statutory authority
to issue Trade Regulation Rules. 9
Reg. 10,116, public hearing cancelled, id. at 14,328 (1970). Perhaps the most con-
troversial Trade Regulation Rule was that which would have required cigarette manu-
facturers to place on cigarette packages a label disclosing that "cigarette smoking is
dangerous to health and may cause death from cancer and other diseases." 29 Fed.
Reg. 8324, 8325 (1964). It was preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Ad-
vertising Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-40 (1970). Only recently has the Commission begun
to make more ambitious use of its rulemaking program. See 16 C.F.R. § 419 (1973)
(regulation of games of chance in the food retailing and gasoline industries); 36 Fed.
Reg. 21,607, 22,187 (1971) (proposed rule requiring disclosure of contract provisions
in franchise agreements); 37 Fed. Reg. 22,934 (1972), 38 Fed. Reg. 30,105, 33,766
(1973) (proposed rule permitting a "cooling off' period after which a consumer may
cancel a "door-to-door" sale); id. at 892 (proposed rule preserving consumers' claims
and defenses against subsequent holders of a consumer note). A current list of all
final and proposed Trade Regulation Rules is reprinted at 4 CCH TRADE REO. REP.
f[[ 38,011-32.
8. 16 C.F.R. § 422.1 (1973).
In establishing the octane rating rule the Commission adhered to the procedural
requirements set forth in section 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5
U.S.C. § 553 (1970), as well as its own procedural rules. 16 C.F.R. § 1.16 (1973).
On July 30, 1969, the FTC published a proposed octane rating rule, the body of which
included the posting requirement. The proposed Rule was accompanied by notice of
the rulemaking proceedings, which were to be open to participation by interested par-
ties. 34 Fed. Reg. 12,449 (1969). Hearings having been held, and data submitted by
participants having been entered into the public record, the Commission issued, on De-
cember 30, 1970, a revised Octane Posting Rule. The Rule was to become effective
six months thereafter. 36 Fed. Reg. 354 (1971). A question arose concerning the
reliability of the method to be used for determining the octane rating and the Commis-
sion reopened the record to inquire into the soundness of the method prescribed.
Id. at 7309. Subsequently, the Commission published a modified Octane Posting
Rule which would require the posting of average or "minimum"' laboratory oc-
tane numbers on dispensing pumps. Id. at 16,120. The final version of the Rule
was published on December 16, 1971, to become effective on March 15, 1972. Id.
at 23,871. The Rule was accompanied by a Statement of Basis and Purpose which
gave as the basis for the Rule the Commission's conclusion that the absence of posted
octane ratings on dispensing pumps adversely influences the consumer's ability to
select the proper gasoline for his automobile. Id. at 23,880.
9. National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 674 n.2 (D.C. Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3485 (U.S. Feb. 26, 1974). Prior to Na-
tional Petroleum Refiners, two previous cases in which the FTC's rulemaking au-
thority had been challenged were dismissed on "ripeness" grounds. Bristol-Myers Co.
v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970); Lever Bros.
Co. v. FTC, 325 F. Supp. 371 (D. Me. 1971). As of 1973, the Commission had not




The district court, ruling in favor of the plaintiffs' motion for sum-
mary judgement, held that the Commission's rulemaking authority un-
der the FTCA was limited to procedural and housekeeping matters
and therefore found the challenged Trade Regulation Rule invalid.1,
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
in National Petroleum Refiners Association v. FTC," reversed, hold-
ing that the FTC's rulemaking power is sufficiently broad to encom-
pass substantive, as well as procedural rulemaking.12
This Note will discuss the question of whether the FTCA author-
izes substantive rulemaking by the FTC. After initially examining
the statutory framework of the FTCA, it then will discuss judicial in-
terpretations of the rulemaking authority of other federal regulatory
agencies. Finally, it will compare the contrasting opinions of the dis-
trict court and the court of appeals in the National Petroleum Refiners
litigation and assess the impact of the latter decision upon the FTC.
STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
Section 6(g) of the FTCA
The statutory provisions scrutinized in National Petroleum Refin-
ers are contained in sections 5 and 6 of the FTCA.'8 In addition
to the broad substantive mandate of the FTC to prevent "[u]nfair
methods of competition in commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in commerce,"'14 section 5 sets forth a comprehensive en-
forcement mechanism by which the Commission is directed to proceed
against suspected violators by issuing a complaint, holding a hearing,
making findings of fact, and issuing a cease and desist order if a viola-
tion is found to have occurred. 5 There is, however, no reference
to rulemaking among these enforcement provisions. The only rule-
10. National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 340 F. Supp. 1343, 1345-46
(D.D.C. 1972), rev'd, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3485
(U.S. Feb. 26, 1974). The district court's decision is noted in 14 B.C. IND. & COM.
L. REv. 368 (1972); 1973 DuYE L.J. 336, in 1972 Developments; 18 S. DAK. L. REv.
243 (1973); and 21 U. KAN. L. REv. 198 (1973).
11. 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3485 (U.S. Feb.
26, 1974). For a discussion of the court of appeals' decision, see Note, Substantive
Rulemaking and the FTC, 41 FORDHAM L. Rav. 178 (1973).
12. 482 F.2d at 685-86, 693.
13. 15 U.S.C. § 45, 46 (1970).
14. Id. § 45(a)(1), (6).
15. Id. § 45(b). Additional provisions in section 5 establish methods of service
of process, id. § 45(f), a grant of jurisdiction and procedures for obtaining judicial
review of cease and desist orders by courts of appeals, id. § 45(c)-(e), (i), criteria
for determining the finality of cease and desist orders, id. § 45(g), and penalties f6r
failure to observe such orders once final, id. § 45(l).
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making provision in the FTCA is section 6(g) which empowers the
FTC to "classify corporations and to make rules and regulations for
the purpose of carrying out the provisions of [the FTCA].' In con-
trast to the scheme of section 5, however, the seven other provisions
of section 6, as well as the first clause of section 6(g) itself, relate
specifically to the Commission's functions of gathering and reporting
data concerning business practices.17 Moreover, it is significant that
the FTCA contains no provisions, comparable to the detailed specifica-
tions applicable to cease and desist order adjudications,' 8 which outline
procedural safeguards for rulemaking or which establish penalties for
violation of section 6(g) rules; nor does the statute provide for judicial
review of such rules.'9 Thus, it has been argued that, in light of the
central importance of substantive rulemaking to both the FTC and reg-
ulated parties, the inconspicuous placement of the rulemaking provi-
sion among the investigatory provisions of section 6 militates against
reading section 6(g), despite its broad language, to permit substantive
rulemaking.20
The Legislative History of the FTCA
This argument is buttressed by a number of elements of the legis-
lative history of the FTCA which tend to undermine the Commission's
claim to substantive rulemaking authority.21 Included in the House
version of the Act 22 was a rulemaking provision nearly identical in
16. Id. § 46(g) (emphasis added).
17. Id. § 46(a)-(f), (h). These provisions empower the FTC to (a) investigate
corporations; (b) require corporations to submit reports concerning their business prac-
tices; (c) investigate possible failures to comply with Department of Justice antitrust
decrees; (d) investigate and report facts concerning alleged antitrust violations to the
President and Congress upon request; (e) investigate and recommend adjustments in
business practices to comply with the law; (f) make reports to the public and Con-
gress; and (h) investigate foreign trade conditions as they affect the United States.
18. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
19. Although it post-dates the FTCA by more than 30 years, the APA and its
procedural and judicial review provisions applicable to rulemaking apply to FTC rule-
making, thus compensating for the absence of such provisions in the FTCA itself. See
Fuchs 797-99; 21 U. KAN. L. REv. 198, 209 (1973).
20. See Burrus & Teter 1121-23, 1125-27; Weston 569-70; Note, The FTC's Claim
of Substantive Rule-making Power: A Study in Opposition, 41 Gno. WASH. L. Rav. 330,
334-35 (1972). But see K. DAVIS §§ 5.04, 6.18 (Supp. 1970); Wegman 741-51.
21. For extensive reviews of the legislative history of the FTCA, see National Pet-
roleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 685-89, 698-709 (Appendix) (D.C. Cir.
1973); G. HENDEimSON, THE FEERAL TRADE CoMUvnsSIoN: A STUDY IN ADMHnISTRA-
nyV LAW AmD PROcEDuRE, 1-48 (1927); Baker & Baum, Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act: A Continuing Process of Redefinition, 7 VILL. L. REy. 517, 520-42
(1962); Note, supra note 20, at 332, 335-39.
22. H.R. 15613, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914).
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terms to section 6(g).23  However, the bill did not confer any inde-
pendent enforcement authority upon the proposed Commission; 24 thus,
the rulemaking provision was limited 'by the entire scheme of the bill
to enabling the Commission to implement the non-substantive tasks
of investigation and recommendation which were to be its primary re-
sponsibilities. Although several attempts were made to amend the
House bill in order to vest the Commission with the authority to make
"rules and regulations" in aid of enforcing a substantive mandate, none
were successful. 25  In contrast, the Senate version,2 6 written as a sub-
stitute for the previously passed House bill, gave the Commission power
to enforce a broad statutory standard of illegality,2 7 yet contained no
rulemaking provision whatever.28 When the two bills came before the
Conference Committee, the only rulemaking provision under consider-
ation was that contained in the House bill. Consequently, it was only
upon the Conference Committee's synthesis of the House and Senate
bills that the FTCA's substantive provisions and the rulemaking provi-
sion were united in a single piece of legislation. Thereafter no refer-
ence was made in the enacting Congress to the possible relationship
between section 6(g) and section 5.9 In fact, the only discussion
23. Section 8 of the House bill provided: 'That the commission may . . . make
rules and regulations . . . for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this Act."
Comparative Print of Federal Trade Commission Bill, S. Doc. No. 573, 63d Cong.,
2d Sess. 15 (1914) (reprint of House, Senate, and Conference Committee bills).
24. The bill contained no substantive prohibitions or any declarations of illegality,
nor did it provide for any enforcement mechanism. H.R. 15613, 63d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1914). The bill would have limited the functions of the Commission to those of an
investigatory and advisory nature. See H. RP. No. 533, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-7
(1914); Baker & Baum, supra note 21, at 525-26.
25. See H.R. REP. No. 533, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., Pt. 3, Appendix 19, 21 (1914)
(Representative Lafferty's minority proposal, made in committee); 51 CoNG. REc.
9047, 9050 (1914) (Representative Morgan's amendment); id. at 9056 (Representative
Dillon's amendment).
26. S. 4160, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914).
27. The substantive standard of illegality-a prohibition of "unfair competition"--
was deliberately left broad and unspecific so to prevent ingenious monopolists from in-
venting new forms of business practices detrimental to competition which would be be-
yond the foresight of the framers. Id. § 5; Comparative Print, supra note 23, at 7-
9. See also S. REP. No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1914). Like the House bill,
the Senate version included provisions which granted the Commission investigatory and
advisory functions, and power to aid the courts in shaping decrees pursuant to suits
under the antitrust laws. See id. at 11-13.
28. S. 4160, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914). See Comparative Print, supra note 23,
at 12.
29. Neither the Conference Committee Report, the Conference Committee's Com-
parative Print (which diagrams the changes made in conference), nor the final floor
debates focused upon the intended scope of section 6(g). See H.R. CoNF. REP. No.
1142, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 11, 18 (1914); Comparative Print, supra note 23, at 12,
15; 51 CoNG. REc. 14,796-802 (Senate), 14,819-943 (House) (1914).
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of the scope of the Commission's powers following the Conference
Committee's synthesis occurred in the House, which was considering
the substantive provisions for the first time. In those debates the
House members of the Conference Committee asserted that the Com-
mission would "have no power to prescribe the methods of competi-
tion . . . in [the] future" and that "it will not be exercising power
of a legislative nature." 30
It is thus apparent that the authority to make substantive rules
was not deliberately granted to the FTC. Those who have contested
the FTC's assertion of substantive rulemaking authority have pointed
to these origins of the FTCA's rulemaking provision and the remarks
made in the final debates in the House as indications that Congress
did not intend to grant such authority to the Commission."' However,
it is a fact that the framers of the FTCA did include in the Act a
rulemaking provision which is not expressly restricted to any particular
matters.3 2  Further, those instrumental in the passage of the bill ex-
pressed their anticipation that the FTC would make strong and af-
firmative use of its power to condemn violations of the FTCA.88
Post-Enactment History
Under generally accepted principles of statutory construction, an
agency's long-standing interpretation of its statutory powers, developed
contemporaneously with the agency's creation, is usually given much
deference by courts when the nature of these powers is in question.84
30. 51 CoNG. R c. 14,932 (1914) (remarks of Representative Covington); see id.
at 14,938 (remarks of Representative Stevens). But see National Petroleum Refiners
Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 706-09 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Wegman 742-45 (indicating
that the context of such remarks renders dubious any conclusion that they were spe-
cifically aimed at foreclosing substantive rulemaking).
31. See Burrus & Teter 11, 22-23; Shapiro 960; Weston 570-71.
32. See notes 16, 29 supra and accompanying text.
33. See 51 CONG. REc. 14,927-28 (1914) (remarks of Representative Coving-
ton); S. REP. No. 597, supra note 27, at 10; H.R. CONF. REp. No. 1142, 63d Cong.,
2d Sess. 19 (1914); Wegman 744.
It should also be noted that the trade commission bill was, to a large extent, the
result of dissatisfaction with the delay and ineffectiveness of the enforcement of the
antitrust laws through traditional litigation in the courts. G. HENDERsoN, supra note 21,
at 17-19; see 51 CONG. Rc. 8974 (1914) (remarks of Representative Murdock); id. at
9057 (remarks of Representative Dillon).
34. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965); 2A J. StrrnHEuLm, STATUTES AD
STATUTORY CONSTRUCITON § 49.04 (Sands 4th rev. ed. 1973). But see note 103 infra.
However, it has been noted that there may be non-statutory reasons for an agency's
reluctance to utilize rulemaking, even though such authority is conferred by the stat-
ute-e.g., budgetary constraints, the need to devote attention to other concerns, or ad-
ministrative inertia. See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 647-48
(1950); Shapiro 942-58. See also A. DowNs, INsmn BuRmucRAcY 167-74 (1967).
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Thus it is significant that the FTC did not assert its authority to issue
substantive rules under the FTCA until 1962,3" and that prior to that
time, the Commission itself had intermittently indicated that the FTCA
did not confer such power upon the agency.8 Even more importantly,
Congress has on several occasions expressly conferred upon the Com-
mission specific statutory authority to make substantive rules with
which to regulate the trade practices of particular industries.3 7  It
35. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
36. The FTC, in its Annual Reports, has described its enforcement proceedings in
terms suggesting that adjudication is the sole method of defining the standard of illegal-
ity, see, e.g., 1951 FTC ANN. REP. 16-18, and has indicated that its rulemaking au-
thority is limited to setting forth standards of voluntary compliance, see, e.g., 1948
FTC ANN. RFP. 2; 1949 FTC ANt. REP. 2. Representatives from the FTC have men-
tioned the Commission's lack of substantive rulemaking authority in testimony before
congressional committees. Hearings on S. 1666 and S. 1663 (in part) Before the
Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Comm. on the Judiciary,
"Freedom of Information," 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 169-70 (1963) (remarks of Paul Rand
Dixon, former Chairman of the FTC); Hearings on S. 387 Before the Subcomm. on
Antitrust and Monopoly of the Comm. on the Judiciary, "Packaging and Labeling,"
88th Cong., 1st Sess. 281 (1963) (remarks of Paul Rand Dixon); see Hearings on
S. 986 Before the Consumer Subcomm. of the Comm. on Commerce, "Consumer
Products Warranties," 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1971) (remarks of Miles W. Kirkpatrick,
former Chairman of the FTC); Hearings on S. 2246, S. 3092 & S. 3201 Before the
Consumer Subcomm. of the Comm. on Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. 9
(1970) (remarks of Caspar W. Weinberger, former Chairman of the FTC). But cf.
United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 169-70 (1968) (the Supreme
Court rejected the contention that requests by the FCC for additional legislation specif-
ically authorizing the regulation of Community Antenna Television precluded an inter-
pretation of the Federal Communications Act of 1934 that the FCC already had such
regulatory authority).
Similar characterizations of the FTC's rulemaking authority have emerged by way
of dicta in a number of Supreme Court decisions. In Humphrey's Executor v. United
States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), the Supreme Court was faced with the question of the
President's power to remove a Federal Trade Commissioner. The opinion, written by
Justice Sutherland, who was a member of the Senate when the FTCA was enacted,
reviewed the powers conferred upon the FTC by sections 1, 5, 6, and 7 of the Act.
The view expressed in the opinion was that the substantive provisions were to be de-
fined in section 5(b) adjudications and that section 6 was concerned with agency in-
vestigations. Id. at 620-21. See also Pan Am. World Airways v. United States,
371 U.S. 296, 307-08 (1963); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295
U.S. 495, 533 (1935); FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 648 (1931); FTC v. Gratz,
253 U.S. 421, 435-37 (1920) (cases indicating that the elaboration of the standard of
illegality is to be brought about by a "gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclu-
sion," FTC v. Raladam Co., supra at 64&). But see Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC, 381
U.S. 357, 390-91 (1965): 'The Commission has the general power to choose to pro-
ceed . . . through either rulemaking or the process of case-by-case adjudication!' (Gold-
berg, I., dissenting).
37. See Wool Products Labeling Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. § 68-68j, 68d(a)
(1970); Fur Products Labeling Act, id. §§ 69-69j, 69f(a)(2)(B); Textile Products
Identificati6n Act, id. H9 70-70k, 70e(c); Flammable Fabrics Act, id. § 1191-2000,
1194(c); Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, id. H9 1451-61, 1454. The rulemaking pro-
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has been suggested that these limited grants of substantive rulemaking
authority reflect a congressional interpretation that the FTC lacks such
power generally."8
EXPANSIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF AGENCY RULEMAKING PowERs
Although the cumulative weight of the legislative89 and post-en-
actment40 histories of the FTCA and the placement of section 6(g)
among the Act's investigative and housekeeping provisions rather than
with the statute's substantive provisions4' tends to undercut the FTC's
claim to substantive rulemaking authority, a number of decisions reveal
a judicial willingness to allow federal regulatory agencies, and the FTC
in particular, substantial procedural flexibility in pursuing their respec-
tive statutory mandates. Prior to the National Petroleum Refiners liti-
gation, no court had squarely faced the question of whether the FTCA
confers substantive rulemaking authority on the Commission.42 How-
ever, in United States v. Morton Salt Co.48 the Supreme Court ob-
served that "[t]he [FTCA] is one of several [statutes] in which
Congress, to make its policy effective, has relied upon the initiative
of administrative officials and the flexiblity of the administrative proc-
ess," 44 and upheld the FTC's authority to employ a "section 6" power
vision in the Flammable Fabrics Act originally empowered the Commission to make
"such rules and regulations as may be necessary and proper for purposes of administra-
tion and enforcement of [the Act]," 67 Stat. 113 (1953), language similar to that con-
tained in section 6(g) of the FTCA. See text accompanying note 16 supra. Congress
amended the provision in 1967, specifically limiting its scope to the "maintenance of
records relating to fabrics, related materials, and products" and added that any violation
of such rules would be a violation of section 5(a) of the FTCA. 15 U.S.C. § 1194
(c) (1970). The Report of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce stated that the purpose of the amendment was to "[permit] flammability standards
and other regulations to be issued under .rulemaking procedures rather than having them
fixed by law as is now the case." H.R. RPP. No. 972, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1967).
38. Burrus & Teter 1125. See also H.R. REP. No. 3236, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 33-
34 (1951) (where the Select Committee on Small Business recommended that "further
study should be given to the possibility of granting to the Commission a comprehensive
rulemaking power"). On the other hand, the isolated views of one Congress as to
the construction of a statute adopted by another Congress are not determinative of leg-
islative intent. Cf. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 170
(1968). Also, it is possible that the unequivocal grants of rulemaking power in the
fur and textile products areas were made in response to the FTC's reluctance to employ
substantive rulemaking under the FTCA and to insure that this type of rulemaking was
undertaken in these specific areas.
39. See notes 21-33 supra and accompanying text.
40. See notes 34-38 supra and accompanying text.
41. See notes 13-20 supra.
42. See National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 693-94 n.27
(D.C. Cir. 1973). See note 9 supra.
43. 338 U.S. 632 (1950).
44. Id. at 640.
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(that of requiring corporations to file special reports pursuant to sec-
tion 6(b) )45 to aid enforcement of a final cease and desist order.4 6
The Court rejected the argument that sections 5 and 6 were directed
toward different functions, enforcement and investigations respectively,
and concluded that the FTCA "must . . .be read as an integrated
whole.147  Similarly, in FTC v. Dean Foods Co.4 the Court sustained
the FTC's power to petition the courts of appeals for jpreliminary relief
to postpone corporate mergers pending the outcome of cease and de-
sist order proceedings, despite the absence of express statutory au-
thorization to do so. The Court concluded in so holding that "[s]uch
ancillary powers have always been treated as essential to the effective
discharge of the Commission's responsibilities." 49
Moreover, decisions in which the Supreme Court has construed
rulemaking provisions in the enabling statutes of other regulatory
agencies suggest that such provisions should be liberally interpreted.
For example, in National Broadcasting Co. v. United States,5" the
Court sustained the issuance of regulations of the Federal Communica-
tions Commission (FCC) aimed at eliminating limitations on program-
ming created by chain broadcasting agreements, despite the absence
of express statutory authorization for the FCC to deal with the contrac-
tual relations between networks and their affiliates."' In reasoning
similar to that followed in the Dean Foods case, the Court determined
that such authority was implicit in the comprehensive nature of the
FCC's statutory mandate to oversee the entire broadcast industry and
to exercise its broadcast licensing power in the "public interest, con-
venience, or necessity."52  Furthermore, the Court rejected the argu-
45. 15 U.S.C. § 46(b) (1970).
46. 338 U.S. at 647-51.
47. Id. at 650. The reasoning employed in Morton Salt has been followed in sub-
sequent cases to sustain FTC rules, issued pursuant to section 6(g) of the FTCA,
which specified the details of service of process under section 5(f) of the FTCA, 15
U.S.C. § 45(f) (1970). Hunt Foods and Indus. Inc. v. FTC, 286 F.2d 803 (9th Cir.
1960); United States v. San Juan Lumber Co., 313 F. Supp. 703 (D. Colo. 1969).
48. 384 U.S. 597 (1966).
49. Id. at 607. The Court elaborated: "It would stultify the congressional
purpose [in entrusting the Commission with enforcement of the Clayton Act and grant-
ing it the power to order divestiture in appropriate cases] to say that the Commission
did not have the incidental power to ask the courts of appeals to exercise their authority
derived from the All Writs Act." Id. at 606 (emphasis added).
50. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
51. Id. at 217-20. The Court's willingness to permit the FCC to regulate matters
beyond the express scope of its powers was also based upon the absence of anything
in the legislative history requiring a "cramping construction" of the statute. Id. at 217-
21.
52. Id. at 215-17.
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ment that the general rulemaking provisions in the FCC's enabling
statute, which are placed among provisions dealing primarily with tech-
nical and financial aspects of broadcasting operations,"8 could not be
employed to particularize the substantive standards embodied in the
agency's statutory mandate, which is set forth in a separate section
of the statute. 54
In a 1973 decision, Mourning v. Family Publications Service,
Inc.,55 the Supreme Court rejected the argument that provisions of the
Truth in Lending Act, 6 which specify that disclosure of contract fi-
nancing information by merchants is required where finance charges
actually are, or may be, imposed, 1 preclude the Federal Reserve
Board from adopting a broader rule which requires similar disclosure
in any transaction involving payment in four or more installments. 8
In so holding the Court found that the rule, while not specifically
authorized, was not only consistent with, but also furthered the policies of
consumer protection underlying the Act:
Where the empowering provision of a statute states simply that the
agency may "make . . . such rules and regulations as may be neces-
sary to carry out the provisions of this Act," we have held that the
validity of a regulation promulgated thereunder will be sustained as
long as it is "reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling leg-
islation." 59
In addition to the above cases, which indicate that agency rule-
53. 47 U.S.C. § 303(i), (r) (1970). Section 303 permits the FCC to exercise
a variety of powers "as public convenience, interest, or necessity requires." Subsection
i) applies to chain broadcasting and subsection (r) permits rulemaking necessary to
carry out the provisions of the FCA. The remaining provisions of section 303 apply
to electronic apparatus and technical requirements of issuing licenses.
54. 319 U.S. at 215-17. See note 51 supra and accompanying text.
55. 411 U.S. 356 (1973).
56. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (1970).
57. Id. § 1631.
58. The "four installment rule" was, however, adopted under authority of a general
rulemaking provision, id. § 1604, specifically applicable to the Board's enforcement
functions. 411 U.S. at 361-62.
59. 411 U.S. at 369 (citations omitted). The "four installment rule" was found to
be a reasonable means of attacking the problem of hidden finance charges. Id. at 371.
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, observed that "[tlo accept respondent's
argument [that the FRB's enforcement authority was confined to the literal terms of
the statute] would undermine the flexibility sought in vesting broad rulemaking author-
ity in an administrative agency." Id. at 372, citing American Trucking Ass'n Inc. v.
United States, 344 U.S. 298, 309-10 (1953). In American Trucking, the Court upheld
Interstate Commerce Commission regulations, adopted pursuant to a broad rulemaking
provision, which limited the use of leased equipment by carriers authorized under the
Motor Carrier Act, 49 U.S.C. H8 301 et seq. (1970), although the subject of equip-
ment leasing was not specifically mentioned in the statute.
[Vol. 1974:297
ADMINISTRATIVE LA W-1973
making powers are to be construed broadly, other decisions reveal a
judicial willingness to sustain agency rulemaking even where the ap-
parent right of regulated parties to have their interests determined in
an agency adjudication is thereby abridged. In the leading case of
United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co.,60 the Supreme Court con-
fronted the question of whether the FCC could issue regulations which
provided that an additional broadcasting license would not be granted
to applicants who already owned a specified number of licensed sta-
tions, even though the FCC's enabling statute specified that adverse
determination of license applications be made only after a "full hear-
ing.""' The Court validated-the rules by concluding: "We do not
read the hearing requirement. . . as withdrawing from the power of
the Commission the rulemaking authority necessary for the orderly
conduct of its business . *2... " The Storer rationale has not been
confined to rulemaking by the FCC;6" and it has been applied to sus-
tain substantive rulemaking even where such rulemaking restricts the
rights of regulated parties to have the status of an existing privilege
determined in an adjudicatory context. 64
60. 351 U.S. 192 (1956).
61. Act of July 16, 1952, ch. 879, § 7, 66 Stat. 715.
62. 351 U.S. at 202. The FCC asserted as the basis for its authority the rulemak-
ing provisions of section 303, 47 U.S.C. § 303(f), (r) (1970), and another provi-
sion, id. § 154(i), which permits rulemaking "necessary in the execution of its func-
tions." 351 U.S. at 201.
The Court emphasized that the "Communications Act must be read as a whole
and with appreciation of the responsibilities of the body charged with its fair and effi-
cient operation." Id. at 203 (emphasis added).
63. Storer was followed in FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33 (1964). At issue
in that case was the validity of regulations issued by the Federal Power Commission,
pursuant to section 16 of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717(o) (1970), which
provided for summary rejection of applications for certificates of public convenience
and necessity to supply pipelines with natural gas if the supply contracts, submitted
in support of the applications, contained price clauses not "permitted" by the regula-
tions. 377 U.S. at 34-37. Section 7 of the Act specified that applications for certifi-
cates could be denied only after an agency hearing. 15 U.S.C. § 717(f) (1970). The
Court concluded that "the statutory requirement for a hearing . . . does not pre-
clude the Commission from particularizing statutory standards through the rulemaking
process and barring at the threshold those who neither measure up to them nor show
reasons why in the public interest the rule should be waived." 377 U.S. at 39.
64. In American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 843 (1966), the plaintiffs challenged the validity of a rule which was issued
by the Civil Aeronautics Board, pursuant to a grant of authority to promulgate substan-
tive rules, 49 U.S.C. § 1354(a) (1970), and which conferred an exclusive privilege
to all-cargo air carriers to provide "blocked space" (discount rate) service. 359 F.2d
at 625-27. The rule was upheld notwithstanding that it operated to modify the out-
standing certificates of combination carriers (passengers and cargo), which had previ-
ously been allowed to offer such service, and that the statute, 49 U.S.C. § 1371(g)
(1970), required that certificates be altered only after notice and a hearing. 359 F.2d
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Recently, in Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc.,8
the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Storer analysis in sustaining regula-
tions issued by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) which pro-
vide that unless the manufacturer of a drug under FDA scrutiny sub-
mits data in accordance with specified scientific testing criteria to sup-
port the claimed efficacy of the drug, the FDA will withdraw market
clearance for the drug without a hearing. 6e Notwithstanding the statu-
tory requirement that the FDA conduct a hearing prior to withdrawing
its approval of a drug,67 the Court held that such a requirement does
not prevent the agency from "particularizing statutory standards
through the rulemaking process" and from denying a hearing to those
who fail to meet such standards.6 8  The Court observed that the FDA
"could not fulfill its statutory mandate" if the status of each of the
at 626. The court of appeals found Storer dispositive:
[Tihe Storer doctrine is not to be revised or reshaped by reference to fortui-
tous circumstances. It rests on a fundamental awareness that rule making is
a vital part of the administrative process, particularly adapted to and needful
for sound evolution of policy in guiding the future development of industries
subject to intensive administrative regulation in the public interest, and that
such rulemaking is not to be shackled, in the absence of clear and specific
Congressional requirement, by importation of formalities developed for the ad-judicatory process and basically unsuited for policy rule making. Id. at 629
(emphasis added).
See also WBEN v. United States, 396 F.2d 601 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
914 (1968) (FCC rules altering the operations of pre-sunrise radio broadcasters up-
held, even though a modification of a broadcaster's license ordinarily required a hear-
ing); California Citizens Band Ass'n v. United States, 375 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1967)
(FCC rules operating to modify the powers of all members of a certain class of citizens
radio service licensees held valid despite the fact that an individualized hearing was
required for license modification); Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Quesada, 276 F.2d
892 (2d Cir. 1960) (FAA regulation prohibiting further service by airline pilots after
their sixtieth birthday upheld against the claim that it had the effect of modifying ex-
isting pilots' licenses without individualized hearings). See generally Rulemaking to
Deny Adjudications 1086.
65. 412 U.S. 609 (1973).
66. Id. at 620; 21 C.F.R. §§ 130.12(a)(5), 130.14(b) (1973). The regulations
were issued pursuant to a provision of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of
1938, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq. (1970), which empowers the FDA to make regulations
in aid of enforcement of the statute, id. § 371(a).
All "drugs" come within the requirements of the Drug Amendments of 1962, Act
of Oct. 10, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (codified in sections of 21 U.S.C.),
which amended portions of the 1938 Act, and redefined "new drug" to include not
only those drugs which have not been recognized among experts as safe but also those
not recognized as effective for their intended use. 21 U.S.C. § 32 1(p)(1) (1970).
Products classified as "new drugs" cannot be marketed without FDA approval in the
form of an approved new drug application (NDA). Id. § 355(a). The FDA is di-
rected to refuse NDAs or, in certain instances, to withdraw existing NDAs unless there
is a showing of "substantial evidence" that the drug in question is both safe and effec-
tive. Id. §§ 355(d), (e), as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 355(e) (Supp. II 1972).
67. 21 U.S.C. § 355(e), as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 355(e) (Supp. II 1972).
68. 412 U.S. at 620-21, quoting FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33, 39 (1964).
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several thousand substances submitted annually for approval had to
be determined in a full agency hearing.B9
These decisions upholding substantive rulemaking efforts by
other agencies, while not determinative of the proper scope of section
6(g), 70 reveal a clearly articulated judicial concern for the capacity
of regulatory agencies to effectively pursue their statutory mandates
and a recognition that substantive rulemaking may properly be em-
69. 412 U.S. at 621. The Court emphasized the futility of holding individualized
hearings where the application itself reveals that the applicant cannot succeed in meet-
ing the evidentiary burden. Id. at 620-21.
The Court also approved the FDA's practice of comprehensively defining all prod-
ucts within a generic category as "new drugs" for which agency approval is required,
see note 66 supra, by means of a declaratory order issued pursuant to a single adminis-
trative proceeding. See section 5(d) of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 554(e) (1970). In
so doing, the Court rejected the argument that the manufacturer of each product was
entitled to individualized hearings. 412 U.S. at 624-26.
The Court noted that for every approved drug there were at least five similar prod-
ucts which had been marketed without approval, but under the implicit security of the
FDA's approval of the "pioneer" drug. Determining the status of these "me-too" drugs
on a case-by-case basis, the Court stated, would "paralyze" the FDA. Id.
In a companion case, Weinberger v. Bentex Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 412 U.S. 645
(1973), the FDA's claim to have jurisdiction to decide in an agency hearing whether
a product is a "new drug," rather than having to litigate that issue in a district court,
was sustained. The Court concluded:
The deluge of litigation that would follow if "me-too" drugs and tover-the-
counter] drugs had to receive de novo hearings in the courts would ...not
[inure] to the interests of the public that Congress was anxious to protect
.... In a case much more clouded with doubts than this one, we held that
we would not "in the absence of compelling evidence that such was Con-
gress' intention ...prohibit administrative action imperative for the achieve-
ment of an agency's ultimate purposes. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390
U.S. 747-780 [1968]." 412 U.S. at 653 (emphasis added).
70. Administrative agencies are not "fungibles," see American Airlines, Inc. v.
CAB, 359 F.2d 624, 635 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966) (Burger, I.,
dissenting); the purposes underlying their creation, the respective legislative histories
accompanying the enabling statutes, and the overall scheme of those statutes vary from
one agency to another.
Unlike the commerce-wide jurisdiction of the FTC, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(a) (1), (6)
(1970), other regulatory agencies were created to provide comprehensive regulation of
particular segments of the economy such as natural gas and electric power (FPC), 15
U.S.C. §§ 717 et seq. (1970); foods, drugs, and cosmetics (FDA), 21 U.S.C. §§ 301
et seq. (1970); communications (FCC), 47 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1970); transporta-
tion (ICC), 49 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq. (1970); and airlines (CAB), id. §§ 1301 et seq.
Further, both the language and the context of the general rulemaking provisions in the
enabling statutes of other federal regulatory agencies more clearly support substantive
rulemaking than does section 6(g) of the FTCA. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 46(g) (1970)
(FTC with id. § 717(o) (FPC); 47 U.S.C. §§ 154(i), 303(f), (r) (1970) (FCC);
49 U.S.C. §§ 304(a), (b) (1970) (ICC); and id. §§ 1324(a), 1354(a) (CAB). Sig-
nificantly, in each of the enabling statutes of these agencies, unlike the FTCA, there
are provisions establishing penalties for violation of agency regulations. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 717t(b) (1970) (FPC); 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(4) (1970) (FCC); id. §§ 1471(a),
1472(a) (CAB). See also Note, supra note 20, at 346.
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ployed to enhance that capacity. 71 Moreover, they indicate that sub-
stantive rulemaking can be utilized in conjunction with agency hearings
to define and enforce broad substantive provisions in an enabling stat-
ute.72
In addition to the above cases which implicitly recognize the val-
uable role that rulemaking can play in an agency's carrying out its
enforcement responsibilities, other recent cases indicate that use of
rulemaking in formulating agency policy is often fairer to regulated
parties than adherence to a case-by-case approach. In NLRB v. Wy-
man-Gordon Co.,73 the National Labor Relations Board, which is spe-
cifically authorized by statute to promulgate substantive rules,74 sought
to apply in an adjudicatory proceeding against Wyman-Gordon, a
"rule" developed in -a previous adjudication.75  The Supreme Court up-
held the NLRB's order against Wyman-Gordon even though six Jus-
tices, including Harlan and Douglas, who dissented from the actual
holding, viewed the Board's efforts as a near-deliberate attempt to
make prospective rules of general applicability without meeting the
requirements for rulemaking set forth in Section 4 of the APA.7 0  The
71. See, e.g., Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 371-
73, 376 (1973); cf. American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624, 633 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966). See notes 55-69 supra and accompanying text.
72. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 620-
22 (1973); FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33, 44 (1964); United States v. Storer
Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 203, 205 (1956); American Airlines v. CAB, 359 F.2d
624, 629-33 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966); Air Line Pilots Ass'n,
Int'l v. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892, 896 (2d Cir. 1960); 1 K. DAVIs §§ 7.02, 7.06; Rulemak-
ing to Deny Adjudication 1093-96, 1112-14; see notes 60-69 supra and accompanying
text. But see Robinson 519-25.
73. 394 U.S. 759 (1969).
74. 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1970).
75. In the prior adjudication, Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236
(1966), the Labor Board considered objections of unions which had lost at least two
representation elections, purportedly because the companies involved had not furnished
the unions with lists of the names and addresses of employees eligible to vote. The
NLRB "invited certain interested parties" to file amici briefs and to participate in the
proceedings. Id. at 1238. The decision reached by the NLRB in Excelsior announced
the requirement, "[applicable] in all election cases," that companies must provide
unions with such lists. Id. at 1239-40. The requirement was not applied, however,
to the firms in Excelsior, but was to be applied prospectively. Id. at 1240 n.5.
The Wyman-Gordon litigation arose upon complaint of several unions which had
lost representation elections among the employees of that firm. As a remedial meas-
ure, the NLRB ordered new elections. 394 U.S. at 761. In response to the company's
refusal to provide the unions with the names and addresses of its employees, the NLRB,
apparently in conformance with the Excelsior rule, ordered that such lists be made
available. Id. at 761-63.
76. Four justices, a plurality, objected to the directive formulated in Excelsior, see
note 75 supra, finding it equivalent to a "rule" as defined in section 2(c) of the APA,
5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1970), and therefore void because it was not issued pursuant to
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common point of agreement centered on the absence of fairness in
this type of policymaking, as was expressed by Justice Fortas in the
plurality opinion:
The rulemaking provisions of [the APA], which the Board would
avoid, were designed to assure fairness and mature consideration of
,rules of general application. They may not be avoided by the process
of making rules in the course of adjudicatory proceedings. 77
The standard of fairness suggested in Wyman-Gordon has been
followed recently in Bell Aerospace Co., Division of Textron, Inc. v.
NLRB,78 in which the Second Circuit refused to enforce an NLRB order
which was based upon a radical change in agency policy, -and upon which
regulated parties had long placed their reliance,79 because it was
adopted in a prior adjudication rather than pursuant to rulemaking pro-
ceedings.80 Taken together, Wyman-Gordon and Bell Aerospace sug-
the rulemaking procedures set forth in section 4 of the APA, fd. § 553; however, they
were of the opinion that such a directive could be, and was, validly redeveloped in
the Wyman-Gordon case. 394 U.S. at 753-66. Three justices, led by Justice Black,
had no objection to the development of a prospective directive in an adjudication or
its application to Wyman-Gordon. Id. at 769-75. Justices Harlan and Douglas each
wrote separate dissenting opinions, and both agreed that the directive was a "rule" and,
not having been adopted pursuant to APA requirements for rulemaking, was totally
void. Id. at 775-83.
77. 394 U.S. at 764 (citations omitted). Justice Douglas, in dissent, observed:
The [APA] rule-making procedure performs important functions. It
gives notice to an entire segment of society of those controls or regimentation
that is forthcoming. It gives an opportunity for persons affected to be heard
.. . . Id. at 777.
This view was initially suggested in SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947),.
where the Supreme Court upheld an SEC "rule," adopted during reorganization pro-
ceedings, which prohibited trading in company securities by management personnel
pending the outcome of the reorganization. The Court felt that the agency should be
permitted to exercise discretion in choosing which procedure-rulemaking or adjudica-
tion-is more appropriate for the evolution of statutory standards. Id. at 201-03.
However, Justice Murphy, writing for the majority emphasized that
[t]he function of filling in the interstices of the Act should be performed, as
much as possible through [the] quasi-legislative promulgation of rules to be
applied in the future. Id. at 202.
78. 475 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd, 42 U.S.L.W. 4564 (U.S. Apr. 23, 1974).
79. The Board reversed "a long-standing and oft-repeated policy" regarding the
types of employees protected under the National Labor Relations Act. 475 F.2d at
497.
80. Id. at 496-97. Judge Friendly, writing for the court, relied heavily upon the
suggestion by the Supreme Court in Wyman-Gordon, see notes 73-77 supra and accom-
panying text, for his conclusion that the Board was required to proceed by rulemaking
procedures in formulating policy. He concluded that "when the ENLRB] has so long
been committed to a position, it should be particularly sure that it has all available
information before adopting another, in a setting where nothing stands in the way ..
of rulemaking. . . "' Id. at 497.
The Supreme Court recently reversed the Second Circuit in Bell Aerospace. The
Court held that Chenery and Wyman-Gordon made "plain that the Board is not pre-
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gest an emerging willingness on the part of courts to require an
agency, where its substantive rulemaking authority is clear, to develop
policy innovations through rulemaking procedures, at least in those in-
stances where to do otherwise would be unnecessary and unfair to
regulated parties not before the agency.81 Furthermore, they indicate
a recognition by the courts of the adequacy of rulemaking procedures
to protect the rights of regulated parties in the process of agency pol-
icymaking.8 2
JUDICIAL RESOLUTION
The District Court's Decision
Despite the apparent cogency of the above decisions in which
rulemaking provisions in the enabling statutes of other agencies have
been broadly interpreted, the district court in National Petroleum Re-
finers v. FTC found them to be inapposite to the question of the
proper construction of section 6(g) of the FTCA. 8 Instead, the court
focused upon the location of that rulemaking provision within the stat-
ute"4 and the legislative history of the FTCA8 5 and concluded that
because "[s]ection 6(g) . . . was intended only as an authorization
for internal rules of organization, practice, and procedure, . . . the
Commission has no substantive, legislative rulemaking authority under
the FTCA.' '8 6
The court acknowledged that the language of section 6(g) might
appear "at first impression" to support substantive rulemaking. 87
However, since it viewed the operative effect of Trade Regulation
Rules as "circumventing the extensive due process procedures ex-
pressly provided for in section 5 of the FTCA," the district court re-
cluded from announcing new principles in an adjudicative proceeding and that the
choice between rulemaking and adjudication lies in the first instance with the Board's
discretion." NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 42 U.S.L.W. 4564, 4572 (U.S. Apr. 23,
1974). However, the Court observed that "there may be situations where the Board's
reliance on adjudication would amount to an abuse of discretion ... " Id.
81. See notes 73-80 supra and accompanying text.
82. See NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 764, 777-79; Bell Aerospace
Co., Div. of Textron, Inc. v. NLRB, 475 F.2d 485, 495-97 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd, 42
U.S.L.W. 4564 (U.S. Apr. 23, 1974).
83. National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 340 F. Supp. 1343, 1349 n.32
(D.D.C. 1972). See notes 43-69 supra and accompanying text. The court took the
position that "the FTC is materially distinct from other administrative bodies" because
it is primarily an investigative, rather than a regulatory body. 340 F. Supp. at 1345.
84. See notes 13-20 supra and accompanying text.
85. See notes 21-33 supra and accompanying text.
86. 340 F. Supp. at 1345-48.
87. Id. at 1345.
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quired the Commission to provide additional, persuasive evidence that
the asserted authority was conferred upon it by Congress in 1914.88
Because there was no express indication in section 6(g) or in the final
floor debates that rulemaking was to be used as an alternative means
of defining and enforcing the FTCA's substantive requirements, the
court concluded that the scope of section 6(g) was limited, as was
the rulemaking provision in the House bill, to non-substantive mat-
ters.89 Furthermore, the court found the rejection by the House of
several amendments, which would have enabled the FTC to make sub-
stantive rules, to be a significant indication of Congress' intent to with-
hold such rulemaking authority.90 The court observed that subsequent
to its creation, the FTC was conventionally viewed as lacking the au-
thority to make substantive rules91 and found the specific authoriza-
tions of the FTC to exercise such power only in severely constricted
areas to be another "critical factor" which militated against the Com-
mission's claim that it was granted an unrestricted rulemaking power
in 1914.2 Having concluded that the only rulemaking provision in
the FTCA did not authorize substantive rulemaking, the court found
it impossible, because of the contrary nature of the legislative history,
to accept the FTC's alternative contention that rulemaking authority
could be implied from its broad mandate to prevent unfair competi-
tion.9 3  Finally, the court characterized the Commission's argument
that policymaking through legislative rulemaking would not only en-
88. Id. at 1346-47.
89. Id. at 1345-48. District Judge Robinson emphasized that
[i]f Congress at any time had intended to confer upon the Commission the
authority to prescribe substantive law in such a manner as to vitiate the sub-
stantial procedural safeguards specified in the Act itself, there certainly would
be some reference to this extraordinary grant of power in the Act or the leg-
islative history. Id. at 1347.
See notes 29, 30 and accompanying text.
90. 340 F. Supp. at 1346. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
91. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
92. 340 F. Supp. at 1347, 1349-50. See notes 37, 38 supra and accompanying
text. The district judge reasoned that such specific grants of rulemaking power would
be "meaningless and superfluous" if Congress had granted such authority to the Com-
mission in 1914. Id. at 1347.
93. Id. at 1349. The FrC argued that since the FTCA's legislative history indi-
cated that the Commission was to have broad powers to define the statutory standard
of illegality, see note 33 supra and accompanying text, the power to make legislative
rules concerning substantive matters could be implied, on the basis of necessity, from
the statutory mandate itself. See also 1964 Statement of Basis 8369, 8370. The court
conceded that grants of substantive rulemaking power have been implied from imprecise
statutory provisions, but never where the legislative history was so "overwhelmingly con-
trary," 340 F. Supp. at 1349, and distinguished National Broadcasting Co. v. United
States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943) on this basis, 340 F. Supp. at 1349 n.32. See notes 50-54
supra and accompanying text. But see K. DAvis, DiscRETioNARY Jusrica 65-77 (1969).
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hance the agency's effectiveness, but also would be fairer to regulated
parties, as a "bootstrap operation" intended to persuade the court to
"supply" authority which Congress had not itself conferred.94
The Court of Appeals' Decision
In contrast, the court of appeals in National Petroleum Refiners
found the language of section 6(g) sufficiently broad to authorize sub-
stantive rulemaking. Conceding that it was "arguable" that the rule-
making power conferred on the Commission by that provision ex-
tended only to procedural or housekeeping matters, the court saw "no
reason to import such a restriction on the 'rules and regulations' per-
mitted by section 6(g)."91 In reaching this conclusion the court was
influenced by several factors. First, it noted the judicial precedents
which emphasized "the need to interpret liberally broad grants of rule-
making authority."96 Such decisions, the court felt, revealed a judicial
94. 340 F. Supp. at 1349-50 nn. 33-36; see Note, supra note 6, at 383 n.113.
95. National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 678 (D.C. Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3485 (U.S. Feb. 26, 1974). The court re-
jected outright the Petroleum Refiners' contention that section 6(g) was limited by
its context to matters unrelated to agency adjudications by observing that section 6(g)
is lacking in words restricting its scope, that section 5 contains no language indicating
that adjudication is the exclusive mode of defining the standard of illegality, and fi-
nally, that section 6(g) expressly permits rulemaking to "carry out" all provisions of
the FTCA including section 5 adjudications. 482 F.2d at 676. The court stressed the
fact that the use of Trade Regulation Rules "does not in any formal sense circumvent"
the mode of enforcement set forth in section 5(b) of the FTCA because adjudications
must still be held to give legal effect to the policy determination embodied in such
rules. Id. at 675, 678. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied upon
United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950) and other cases upholding an
integral reading of sections 5 and 6, see notes 43-47 supra and accompanying text,
and upon the broad interpretation given to the Commission's enforcement powers in
FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597 (1966), see notes 48-49 supra and accompany-
ing text. 482 F.2d at 676-78.
96. 482 F.2d at 678-84. The court relied upon National Broadcasting Co. v.
United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943), and Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc.,
411 U.S. 356 (1973), as well as United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S.
192 (1956), and its progeny. See notes 50-69 supra and accompanying text. Other
cases in which imprecise grants of rulemaking power have been held to support sub-
stantive rulemaking by other agencies were also cited by the court. 482 F.2d at 680.
Morgan Stanley & Co. v. SEC, 126 F.2d 325, 332 (2d Cir. 1942) (SEC empowered
to issue substantive rules under § 20 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act, 15
U.S.C. § 79t(a) (1970); Borden Co. v. Freeman, 256 F. Supp. 592 (D.N.J. 1966),
affd per curtain, 369 F.2d 404 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 992 (1967) (sec-
tion 463 of the Poultry Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. § 463 (1970), confers power upon
Secretary of Agriculture to promulgate rules which classify and establish labeling re-
quirements for poultry products).
The court noted that the FTC, by virtue of its broad substantive provisions of the
FTCA, was intended to have a pervasive regulatory impact upon business practices and
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recognition that substantive rulemaking provides an administrative
agency with "an invaluable resource-saving flexibility in carrying out
its task of regulating parties subject to its statutory mandate. '97 The
court specifically referred to the Storer line of cases as indicating that
substantive rulemaking could be utilized in conjunction with an adjudi-
catory procedure since it served to simplify and expedite such proceed-
ingsYs Moreover, the court noted that recent decisions such as Wy-
man-Gordon and Bell Aerospace indicate that it may be fairer to regu-
lated parties to utilize rulemaking in the formulation of agency policy
rather than to rely totally upon case-by-case adjudication. 9
Thus, the above decisions convinced the court that the term
"rules and regulations" in section 6(g) should be interpreted to au-
thorize substantive rulemaking unless there was found compelling evi-
dence in the Act's legislative history to the contrary."' 0 In contrast
to the district court, the court of appeals termed the legislative history
"ambiguous," concluding that the Act's framers did not "straight-
forwardly and decisively" confront the precise question of the use of
substantive rulemaking to narrow the inquiry in section 5 adjudica-
tions.' However, the court of appeals found the use of Trade Regu-
is not, therefore, generically dissimilar to other regulatory agencies. See note 33 supra
and accompanying text. Consequently, it rejected the appellees' contention, accepted
by the district court, see note 83 supra and accompanying text, that the FTC was sui
generis-a prosecutorial, rather than a regulatory agency. 482 F.2d at 684-85. In so
doing, the court eliminated an initial obstacle to the applicability of the decisions in
which the rulemaking powers of other agencies have been broadly interpreted.
97. 482 F.2d at 681.
98. Id. at 679-80 n.10.
99. Id. at 681-84. See notes 73-82 supra and accompanying text. The court also
cited SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947), as authority for that proposition.
See note 77 supra. The court conceded that since the agencies involved in those de-
cisions clearly possess substantive rulemaking authority, those opinions were not dis-
positive of the challenge to the FTC's asserted authority. However, the court found
them to be -relevant because they
suggest that contemporary considerations of practicality and fairness-specif-
ically the advisability of utilizing the [APA's] rulemaking procedures to pro-
vide an agency about to embark on legal innovation with all relevant argu-
ments and information-certainly support the Commission's position here.
482 F.2d at 683 (citations omitted).
The court obviously felt that rulemaking contained inherent advantages over adjudica-
tions as a method for the formulation of administrative policy, for in contrasting the
two procedures, the court noted that
utilizing rule-making procedures opens up the process of agency policy innova-
tion to a broad range of criticism, advice and data that is ordinarily less likely
to be forthcoming in adjudication. Moreover, the availability of notice before
promulgation and wide public participation in rule-making avoids the problem
of singling out a single defendant among a group of competitors for initial
imposition of a new and inevitably costly legal obligation. Id.
100. See 482 F.2d at 684-86. See note 96 supra and accompanying text.
101. Id. at 686. The court's review of the legislative history of the FTCA
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lation Rules to be "not only consistent with the original framers' broad
purposes, but . . .a particularly apt means of carrying them out.' 2
Unlike the district court, the court of appeals gave little weight to the
fact that prior to 1962 the Commission itself had construed its enabling
statute as not authorizing substantive rulemaking. 103 Similarly, al-
though the court conceded that the argument that Congress had im-
plicitly recognized that the Commission lacked general substantive
rulemaking power by passing a series of laws which specifically granted
such powers to the Commission in particular areas was a "more
troublesome obstacle to the Commission's position," it found it not dis-
positive.'0" Moreover, the court noted that the district court's deci-
is set forth in an appendix to the opinion, id. at 698-709. The court concluded that
the history of the pertinent 1914 debates leaves us with a few affirmative in-
dications that Section 6(g) encompassed substantive rule-making and a few
cryptic indications that this is not so. As a consequence the need to rely
on the section's language is obvious. Id. at 709.
102. Id. at 686. The court noted that congressional debates preceding the enact-
ment of the FTCA reflected a common "concern over judicial delay, inefficiency and
uncertainty" in the enforcement of the congressional policy against unfair and anti-
competitive business practices. Id. at 689. The court felt that the use of substantive
rulemaking would allow the FTC to pursue its regulation of unfair business practice
with increased efficiency and expedition. Id. at 690-91. Thus, since the legislative
history did not clearly indicate that the framers had deliberately withheld substantive
rulemaking power from the Commission, id. at 698, the court concluded that a liberal
construction of section 6(g) would be consistent with congressional intent:
In determining the legislative intent, our duty is to favor an interpreta-
tion which would render the statutory design effective in terms of the policies
behind its enactment and to avoid an interpretation which would make such
policies more difficult of fulfillment, particularly where as here, that interpre-
tation is consistent with the plain language of the statute. Id. at 689.
See also FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341, 349 (1968); Permian Basin Area
Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 776 (1968).
103. The court distinguished the persuasive force of a contemporaneous construction
by an agency of its powers under an enabling statute which is based upon special
agency expertise from that which is based upon historical and legal analysis, and found
the Commission's longstanding reluctance to assert its authority to promulgate substan-
tive rules as falling within the latter, and less persuasive, category. 482 F.2d at 693-
95. See Thompson v. Clifford, 408 F.2d 154, 167 (D.C. Cir. 1968). See note 36
supra and accompanying text.
104. Conceding the greater force of this argument. . . we believe that it must
not be accepted blindly. In such circumstances it is equally possible that
Congress granted the power out of uncertainty, understandable caution, and
a desire to avoid litigation. 482 F.2d at 696 (emphasis added).
See note 37 supra and accompanying text. The court found "ample evidence" that
Congress "has not wholeheartedly accepted the agency's viewpoint" from statements in
committee reports associated with passage of the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1451-61 (1970), which suggested that the question of the FTC's substantive
rulemaking power under the FTCA was unresolved. 482 F.2d at 696-97. See H.R. Rpm'.
No. 2076, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1966); S. REP. No. 1186, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
40 (1966). Further, the court emphasized that "imputing congressional ratification of
a disputed, administrative construction of its powers is . . . 'shaky business."' 482
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sion would "render the Commission ineffective to do the job assigned
it by Congress."' °5  Thus, since a narrow interpretation was not re-
quired by the Act's legislative and post-enactment history, the court
concluded that the "plain language" of section 6(g), which authorizes
the Commission to "make rules and regulations," is sufficient to em-
power the FTC to promulgate substantive rules of business conduct.Y°8
THE IMPACT OF National Petroleum Refiners oN THE FTC
The court of appeals observed that the FTC "has remained hob-
bled in its task by the delay inherent in repetitious, lengthy litigation
of cases involving complex factual questions under a broad legal stand-
ard.'' 107 In theory, by narrowing the scope of inquiry in agency ad-
judications and by comprehensively determining the illegality of a
trade practice employed by many business entities, it would appear
that the Commission's enforcement problems could be mitigated by
substantive rulemaking. 08 Recalcitrant firms could still force the FTC
to hold individual cease and desist order hearings to enforce a Trade
Regulation Rule, but the "streamlined" nature of the proceedings
would significantly reduce the FTC's litigation burdens. 109 Moreover,
since the content of a Trade Regulation Rule cannot be challenged
in subsequent agency adjudications, it is likely that once the validity
of a rule is established (either through judicial review of a rule itself
or through judicial review of a cease and desist order based upon a
Trade Regulation Rule) those within its scope would comply volun-
F.2d at 697, quoting Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. Int'l Union of Elec. Workers, 367
U.S. 396, 409 (1961).
105. 482 F.2d at 697.
106. Id. at 678, 697-98. It is significant that the FTC reiterated before the court
of appeals the argument it had made in the district court, that substantive rulemaking
authority could be implied merely from the FTCA's substantive mandate to prevent
unfair practices. Brief for Appellants, FTC, at 10-11. See note 94 supra and accom-
panying text. The National Petroleum Refiners court did not discuss this argument
at all and, on the contrary, stressed the importance of the language of section 6(g).
482 F.2d at 674, 685-86, 693. Presumably, without section 6(g) or its equivalent, the
Commission's claim would have been unsuccessful.
107. 482 F.2d at 690. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
108. The National Petroleum Refiners court observed that
the Commission will be able to proceed more expeditiously, give greater cer-
tainty to businesses subject to the [FTCA], and deploy its internal resources
more significantly with a mixed system of rule-making and adjudication than
with adjudication alone. With the issues in Section 5 proceedings reduced by
existence of a rule delineating what is a violation of the statute or what pre-
sumption the Commission proposes to rely upon proceedings will be speeded
up. 482 F.2d at 690.
See notes 4-7 supra and accompanying text.
109. See notes 6, 7 supra and accompanying text.
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tarily."10 Comprehensive treatment will not be appropriate for all
types of illegal trade practices,"1 ' but where violations of the FTCA
occur on an industry-wide scale and are static enough to be effectively
prohibited by a codified policy determination, substantive rulemaking
would tend to enhance the FTC's capacity to prevent such 1ractices. 1 2
In a lengthy policy statement issued at the inauguration of the
Trade Regulation Rule program, the FTC emphasized that the use
of substantive rules, issued pursuant to the procedural requirements
110. There is some empirical data indicating that voluntary compliance would be
increased as a result of the issuance of Trade Regulation Rules. A computer simula-
tion model of the allocation of Commission resources suggests that regulated parties
are not likely to hold out for individual proceedings to enforce a Trade Regulation
Rule because the ratio of litigation expenses to chances of securing an ultimate victory
would be prohibitive. See Posner, The Behavior of Administrative Agencies, 1 J. Lu-
GAL STUDiBS 305, 313 (1972). See also 1967 FTC ANN. REP. 14-15 (survey showing
complete voluntary compliance with two Trade Regulation Rules).
Section 7(d) of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 556(e) (1970), requires that respondents
in an agency hearing be permitted to "show the contrary" where the agency seeks to
take notice of extra-record facts, including those embodied in a Trade Regulation Rule.
The FTC, therefore, must grant respondents an opportunity to demonstrate that special
circumstances warrant waiving the applicability of a Rule in a particular case. Na-
tional Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 692 (D.C. Cir. 1973); 1964
Statement of Basis 8372. However, the burden involved in sustaining a waiver would
likely be a heavy one. See FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33, 40 (1964); United States
v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 205 (1956). This would be consistent with
the scope of rulemaking authority as interpreted by the National Petroleum Refiners
court inasmuch as legislative rules, which operate with the same force as statutory law,
should not be easily bypassed. See Shapiro 966.
111. For example, it has been suggested that FTC rulemaking would be particularly
inappropriate in the antitrust area where flexible solutions are required to avoid signifi-
cant perturbations of the economy. See Burrus & Teter 1127-30; Weston 572-73. In
fact, of the more than twenty Trade Regulation Rules issued thus far, see note 7 supra
and accompanying text, only one has been aimed at a trade practice in violation of
the antitrust laws. Discriminatory Practices in Men's and Boy's Tailored Clothing In-
dustry, 16 C.F.R. § 412 (1973).
112. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202-03 (1947); Baker, Policy by
Rule or Ad-Hoc Approach-Which Should It Be?, 22 LAw & CONTEMP. PROn. 658,
661-62 (1957). In addition to the anticipated benefits of expedited proceedings, see
notes 6-7 supra and accompanying text, there is some indication that increased use of
rulemaking by the FTC will develop the Commission's expertise with regard, at least,
to patterns of consumer behavior. First, the Commission will be able to make more
extensive use of its accumulated experience derived from previous studies, reports and
investigations because section 4 of the APA permits agencies to draw upon, in addition
to submitted data, information in its own files in order to determine the final content
of a rule. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970); see California Citizens Band Ass'n v. United States,
375 F.2d 43, 54 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 844 (1967); Auerbach, supra note
4, at 455-57. Furthermore, in response to the court of appeals' decision in National
Petroleum Refiners, the FTC has initiated a major reorganization of its Bureau of Con-
sumer Protection in order to decentralize the -rulemaking process-an innovation de-
signed to encourage increased rulemaking activity along narrower lines of agency exper-
tise. BNA ANTIRr sT & TR. REG. REP. No. 622, A-16, -17 (July 17, 1973).
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set forth in the APA,"' would not only provide the agency with the
efficiencies of flexibility and comprehensiveness in the development
of agency policy, but also would relieve regulated parties of the "disad-
vantages" of having the substantive requirements of the FTCA developed
exclusively in agency adjudications. 1 4 Regulated parties may very
very well benefit from the fact that substantive requirements adopted
in formal rulemaking proceedings apply to all instances of a particular
illegal practice simultaneously, whereas proceeding case-by-case
against alleged violators places the firms first ordered to cease and desist
at a disadvantage vis-a-vis their competitors." 5  Also, the development
and codification of agency policy pursuant to public 1roceedings will
make regulation by the FTC both more visible and predictable,
thereby facilitating the planning functions of regulated parties."" On
the other hand, as several commentators have suggested, the lack of
flexibility inherent in adjudication as well as the overall benefits of
rulemaking to regulated parties may be overstated."' For example,
the wide participation of interested parties, which is asserted to be one
of the primary advantages of rulemaking, can be accommodated in
adjudication through procedures which provide for expanded notice
and participation by intervenors." 8  Furthermore, by consolidating ac-
tions, encouraging the stipulation of facts, and taking official notice
of generally known facts, an agency can mitigate the problems of delay
and duplicated effort which often reduce the efficiency of the case-
by-case approach." 9  Finally, rules adopted in quasi-legislative pro-
113. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970).
114. 1964 Statement of Basis 8366-68. The arguments put forth by the FTC in
favor of rulemaking over adjudication as a method of formulating policy have been
thoroughly discussed by a number of commentators. See generally Baker, supra note
112, at 660-65; Fisher, Rule Making Activities in Federal Administrative Agencies, 17
AD. L. REv. 252, 259-60 (1965); Fuchs 788-95; Robinson 513-28; Shapiro 929-42.
115. The FTC is not required to suspend the effectiveness of an order against one
firm to cease and desist from illegal conduct until its competitors are similarly pro-
hibited. See FIC v. Universal-Rundle Corp., 387 U.S. 244, 246 (1967); Moog Indus.,
Inc. v. FTC, 355 U.S. 411, 413-14 (1958). Although the Commission could mit-
igate this problem of selective enforcement by joining many, or all, members of an
industry in one proceeding, see Shapiro 935-36, multi-party actions tend to create un-
manageable trial situations. Cf. Pepsico, Inc. v. FTC, 472 F.2d 179, 183 (2d Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 876 (1973).
116. See Shapiro 940-41; FTC Substantive Rulemaking 157.
117. Fuchs 790-95; Robinson 513-28; Shapiro 929-42.
118. See Shapiro 931-32. Moreover, even in rulemaking proceedings the FTC
may dispense with the notice and participation requirements where in its discre-
tion it determines such requirements to be "impractical, unnecessary, or contrary to
the public interest." 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (3) (B) (1970). The Commission has not yet
exercised such discretion, choosing instead to adhere strictly to the procedural require-
ments for rulemaking. See FTC Substantive Rulemaking 160.
119. See Shapiro 936-37.
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ceedings can have a retroactive effect similar to those which emerge
as a by-product of adjudication-in either case, regulated parties may
be required to reverse plans and transactions which were made in re-
liance upon previous regulatory standards.120
More important than the possibility that regulated parties may re-
ceive benefits from FTC substantive rulemaking is the extent to which
the rights of regulated parties will be impaired by the Commission's
departure from its traditional adjudicatory procedures. Because of the
binding effect in subsequent adjudications of Trade Regulation Rules,
the issuance of a rule is itself tantamount to a final determination
of the substantive requirements of the FTCA to which affected regulated
parties must conform.' 2' Consequently, it is of no small concern to
regulated parties that certain trial-type formalities-such as the benefit
of statements under oath, and the opportunity to call, examine, and cross-
examine witnesses-by which it is possible to exert some control over
the admission and probative value of evidence, are not available in
rulemaking proceedings.'2 Storer and its progeny, however, suggest
120. Robinson 517-19; Shapiro 933-35. In the case of the FTC, the cease and desist
order may have a prospective effect; thus, there seems to be little difference in the
retroactive/prospective effect between cease and desist orders and Trade Regulation
Rules. See Note, supra note 4, at 379-80 (1963).
121. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
122. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970). As an integral part of formulating a -rule which
directs regulated parties to refrain from engaging in a deceptive trade practice, the
FTC will often be required to decide upon uniform procedures by which the perform-
ance characteristics of a particular product are determined. For example, octane rat-
ings do not provide a comprehensive measure of the quality of gasoline, but measure
instead its anti-knock characteristics. See Statement of Basis and Purpose of the Trade
Regulation Rule for the Posting of Minimum Octane Numbers on Gasoline Dispensing
Pumps, 36 Fed. Reg. 23,871 (1971). The current rule appears in 16 C.F.R. § 422.1
(1973). There are three ways to obtain octane ratings: The "road" method, a time-
consuming and expensive method which requires testing by a fleet of cars under simu-
lated conditions; and the "research" and "motor" methods, which are laboratory proce-
dures which test gasoline by utilizing a one-cylinder engine under varying conditions.
See 1972 Developments 336 n.4. Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment at 47-48, National Petroleum
Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 340 F. Supp. 1343 (D.D.C. 1972). The FTC decided upon
the average minimum laboratory octane number or (R (research method) + M (motor
method))/2 as the uniform testing standard, the results of which must be posted on
dispensing pumps. 36 Fed. Reg. at 23,882-83 (1971). The Commission's determina-
tions concerning testing procedures and the effect of octane ratings upon consumer be-
havior were based upon its "accumulated knowledge and experience and the Record
in [the rulemaking] proceeding[s] . . . ." Statement of Basis, supra, at 23,880; see
note 8 supra and accompanying text. It is significant that the factual bases of the
Commission's final determination were derived from statements given without the bene-
fit of oath and not subject to cross-examination. This procedure precluded the Pet-
roleum Refiners from presenting a comprehensive rebuttal of the factual support for
the rule and the inferences drawn therefrom. Plaintiffs' Answer to Defendants' Mem-
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that such formalities are not essential to protect regulated parties
where the issues to be resolved are generally applicable to a class of
parties or subjects and primarily require policy judgments by the
agency which are appropriately within its jurisdiction and expertise.tm
The FTC, in fact, has recognized the need to confine substantive
rulemaking to problems for which consolidated treatment is appro-
priate124 and has shown, in its comparatively brief history of substan-
tive rulemaking, a conscientious effort to accurately synthesize and
consider the data and views submitted by interested parties in rule-
making proceedings. 25 Nonetheless, since data introduced in rule-
making proceedings are not subjected to the scrutiny afforded by cross-
examination, erroneous inferences and judgments may be incorporated
into a rule to the detriment of regulated parties. 26
Unless an agency's enabling statute requires the contrary, rule-
making proceedings do not produce a formal record as do administra-
tive hearings1 . 7  Thus, whether a Trade Regulation Rule is reviewed
by a court prior to enforcement, 2 8 or as the underlying basis of a
cease and desist order, the FTC would not be required to demonstrate
that such a rule is supported by "substantial evidence," the probative
burden required to be met to support a determination made in adjudi-
cation, that a particular practice is unfair or deceptive under the
FTCA.129  Presumably, a Trade Regulation Rule will be upheld un-
orandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judg-
ment at 49-55, National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 340 F. Supp. 1343 (D.D.C.
1972); Brief for Appellees, National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n at 2, National Petroleum
Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973). But see Robinson 530-31, 538.
123. See note 72 supra and accompanying text.
124. 1964 Statement of Basis 8368, 8372.
125. FTC Substantive Rulemaking 147-49. See National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n
v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 683 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
126. See note 122 supra and accompanying text.
127. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 556, 557, 706(2) (E) (1970).
128. Pre-enforcement review of agency rules has been cited as one of the primary
benefits to regulated parties because the merits of a regulated party's status are not
yet at issue before the agency. See, e.g., 1964 Statement of Basis 8368; Baker, supra
note 112, at 664-65; Rulemaking to Deny Adjudication 1106-10. However, there
is some question as to whether such review may be obtained where an agency's enabl-
ing statute, like the FTCA, provides only for review of orders. See PBW Stock
Exch., Inc. v. SEC, 485 F.2d 718 (3d Cir. 1973), petition for cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W.
3434 (U.S. Jan. 21, 1974) (No. 73-1134). See Note, Reviewability of Administrative
Action: The Elusive Search for a Pragmatic Standard, 1974 DUJKE L.J. 382, 393-96, in
1973 Developments, for a discussion of this case.
129. Under the APA the "substantial evidence test" applies only to agency action
"reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute," 5 U.S.C. § 706
(2) (E) (1970). This test applies to rulemaking only "when rules are required by stat-
ute to be made on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing." 5 U.S.C.
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less it is found to be "arbitrary or capricious."' 3 °  In the case of the
FTC, however, the disparity in the standards for review of rules and
orders may be relatively insignificant inasmuch as the Commission's
determinations, based upon agency hearing records have in the past been
given much deference by reviewing courts.' 3 ' Thus, while substantive
rulemaking under section 4 of the APA may not provide protection
equivalent to trial-type formalities, it is entirely possible, on the basis
of the Commission's past history of responsiveness and restraint, that
regulated parties, as a whole, will be adequately protected from abuses.
On the other hand, the use of Trade Regulation Rules promises to be a
means whereby the Commission can assert its expertise, especially
in the burgeoning area of consumer protection, and more ef-
fectively enforce the FTCA. In short, the potential for such rule-
making to enhance the FTC's capacity to pursue its statutory mandate
probably outweighs the possibility that regulated parties will be more
vulnerable to improper regulatory action. 82
CONCLUSION
The decision in National Petroleum Refiners contravened the
prevailing view among commentators'3 3 and former statements by the
Commission itself'3 4 that the FTC, unlike most administrative agen-
cies, lacked statutory authority to promulgate substantive rules. In
holding to the contrary, the court of appeals specifically denied that
it did so on the basis of "a policy judgment as to what mode of pro-
cedure-adjudication alone or a mixed system of rulemaking and ad-
§ 553(c). See Borden Co. v. Freeman, 256 F. Supp. 592, 601 (D.N.J.), aff'd, 369
F.2d 404 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 992 (1967).
130. Section 10(e) of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A) (1970). The nature of this
standard of review was outlined by Judge Wright in the National Petroleum Refiners
opinion:
Any fears that an agency could successfully use rule-making power as a means
of oppressive or unreasonable regulation seem exaggerated in view of courts'
general practice in reviewing rules to scrutinize their statement of basis and
purpose to see whether the major issues of policy pro and con raised in the
submissions to the agency were given sufficient consideration. 482 F.2d at
692 (emphasis added).
See Rulemaking to Deny Adjudication 1109-10.
131. FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 385 (1965). See FTC v. Sperry
& Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239-44 (1972); FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S.
316, 320-22 (1966).
132. See notes 108-12, 121-32 supra and accompanying text. See 482 F.2d at 692-
93.
133. See Burrus & Teter 1120-27; Handler, Unfair Competition, 21 IowA L. REv.
175 (1936); Robinson 490-96; Shapiro 958-67; Weston 567-73; Note, supra note 20,
at 346-47.
134. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
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judication . . . best accommodates the need for effective enforcement
of the Commission's mandate with maximum solicitude for the inter-
ests of the regulated parties."'1 5 Nevertheless, the court's willingness to
liberally construe the language of section 6(g) was based in great
part on a recognition of the advantages inherent in the utilization of
rulemaking in formulating agency policy. 8 " The FTC has been the
subject of severe criticism for its failure to implement effectively its
broad statutory mandate to prevent unfair and deceptive business prac-
tices. 137 Therefore, to the extent that substantive rulemaking au-
thority will enhance the FTC's capacity to enforce the FTCA, the Na-
tional Petroleum Refiners decision appears consistent with the broad
purposes behind the Act.138  An immediate result of the National Pe-
troleum Refiners decision may be a significant expansion of the Com-
mission's Trade Regulation Rule program. 39  Increased reliance upon
Trade Regulation Rules to designate particular business practices as
unfair or deceptive may eventually result in the development of a com-
prehensive federal code of consumer protection which would provide
the nation's consumers with protection comparable to that which the
federal securities laws provide to investors. 4"
135. 482 F.2d at 674.
136. Id. at 681-84, 690-93. See notes 113-120 supra and accompanying text.
137. See notes 4, 5 supra and accompanying text.
138. See notes 33, 102, 103 supra and accompanying text. The approach of the Na-
tional Petroleum Refiners court, in sum, amounts to a willingness to permit the FTC
to attempt to increase its effectiveness until it can be shown that the rights of regu-
lated parties will necessarily be abused:
[i]a the event Congress decides that the scope of the rule-making power that
we find to be implied in the [FFCA] is too broad or lacks sufficient safeguards,
surely it appears in a prime position to make the required changes. 482 F.2d
at 697 n.40.
There is currently before Congress legislation which would clarify, but limit, the FTC's
rulemaking power under section 6(g). See H.R. 20, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 203
(1973). A rulemaking provision which would simply have clarified section 6(g) as
conferring substantive rulemaking authority was deleted from the Senate counterpart
to the House bill following the decision in National Petroleum Refiners, Wall St. Jour-
nal, Sept. 13, 1973, at 10, col. 3. It may well be that Congress will give the FTC
an opportunity to make substantive rules pursuant to section 6(g) until clarifying leg-
islation becomes necessary. See generally FTC Substantive Rulemaking 161-70.
139. See note 7 supra and accompanying text. See FTC Substantive Rulemaking
145-47.
140. It has been said that Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970) and the corresponding regulation Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (1973), have led to the development of a "federal corporation law." See
W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CoRpoRATIoNs 14 (4th ed. 1969).
Professor Davis has indicated that an increased use of rulemaking by the FTC
to develop a comprehensive business code would be a desirable goal. K. DAvis, Discnn-
TIONARY JUSTiCE 72 (1969).
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